Abstract. Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic public key encryption scheme that uses ideal lattices. He based the security of his scheme on the hardness of two problems: an average-case decision problem over ideal lattices, and the sparse (or "low-weight") subset sum problem (SSSP). We provide a key generation algorithm for Gentry's scheme that generates ideal lattices according to a "nice" average-case distribution. Then, we prove a worst-case / average-case connection that bases Gentry's scheme (in part) on the quantum hardness of the shortest independent vector problem (SIVP) over ideal lattices in the worst-case. (We cannot remove the need to assume that the SSSP is hard.) Our worst-case / average-case connection is the first where the average-case lattice is an ideal lattice, which seems to be necessary to support the security of Gentry's scheme.
Introduction
Recently, Gentry [10] presented a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that uses ideal lattices, and proved its security based on an average-case decision problem. In this paper, we focus on this somewhat homomorphic scheme and its security. Our main results are:
-Algorithms for his scheme -most importantly, a KeyGen algorithm for generating secret and public bases of an ideal lattice -that permit the scheme's semantic security to be based on a search problem over ideal lattices having a nice average-case distribution. -A quantum worst-case / average-case reduction, which ultimately bases the security of Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme on the worst-case quantum hardness of the shortest independent vector problem (SIVP) over ideal lattices.
very tight worst-case / average-case reduction where the worst-case lattices are ideal lattices, and where the average-case lattices are derived from ideal lattices in a way similar to that used by Micciancio. Some other results in this line of work include [27, 17, 20] . However, again, previous work does not provide a worst-case / average-case "random self-reduction" where both average-case and worst-case lattices are ideal lattices of the same dimension in the same ring, which seems to be necessary to preserve the algebraic structure used by Gentry's scheme, and thus necessary to support the security of Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme. This suggests that we need an approach fundamentally different from Ajtai's and other previous work. We also need a KeyGen algorithm for Gentry's scheme that generates an ideal lattice, together with a secret basis of the lattice, according to the appropriate average-case distribution.
Our Worst-Case / Average-Case Self-Reduction
We provide the first worst-case / average-case self-reduction where the averagecase lattice is an ideal lattice. We focus on the reduction for BDDP over ideal lattices, but this reduction can be extended to other ideal lattice problems. Combining with other results presented here and in prior work, this reduction bases the security of Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme on worst-case hardness.
Our reduction makes heavy use of the algebraic properties of ideals. Interestingly, and quite unlike other worst-case / average-case reductions, our reduction uses an integer factoring oracle to factor ideals in the ring. This integer factoring oracle can be instantiated efficiently with quantum computation [32] , and hence we get an efficient quantum reduction. The reduction is also meaningful in the classical setting, since there are known sub-exponential factoring algorithms for factoring (e.g., the number field sieve). If solving average-case problems over ideal lattices is easy, our reduction implies that there are surprising sub-exponential algorithms for solving worst-case problems over ideal lattices.
Since our worst-case and average-case instances involve ideal lattices of the same dimension within the same ring R, one may prefer to think of our reduction as a "random self-reduction". It is an "imperfect" self-reduction in that the approximation factor is larger in the worst-case problem than in the averagecase problem by a poly(n) factor (for the rings R that we use). However, as far as we know, the BDDP is hard even for sub-exponential approximation factors -i.e., for factors much larger than our reduction's poly(n) lossiness.
Roughly speaking, the reduction works as follows. We are given the basis B M of a worst-case ideal lattice M that corresponds to an ideal in the ring R, together with a vector t ∈ R n that is close to some vector u ∈ M ; the BDDP is to output u. To generate an average-case instance, we first sample a "random" vector v from the inverse ideal M −1 according to a particular distribution. We multiply (in the ring R) each of the basis elements of B M by v to obtain a basis B L of the lattice for the ideal L = M · (v), and set u ← v × u. L will be an ideal in R that is not divisible by M , since v ∈ M −1 and thus "cancels" M .
However, due to v's distribution, L's geometry will be very closely related to M ; in particular, solving BDDP for (L, u ) will help solve BDDP for (M, u). Toward solving BDDP for (L, u ), we use our factoring oracle to find a "suitable" ideal J that divides L (restarting if no suitable one exists), and output the instance (J, u ) to our average-case BDDP solver. Note that L is a subset of J. As long as L is not an overly sparse subset, and for suitable parameters, the closest vector in J to u will also be in L. Hence, a BDDP solution to average-case instance (J, u ) leads to a BDDP solution to the worst-case instance (M, u). We show that J comes from our desired average-case distribution -i.e., that it is uniformly random among regular prime ideals in R whose norms are in a prescribed interval. Of course, the target vector u 's distribution is not random -i.e., is not independent of the worst-case instance -but we also show how to randomize the target vector's distribution. See Section 3 for details and proofs.
How to Generate an Average Ideal Lattice, and Other Results
In [10] , Gentry mentions some ad hoc ways of generating an ideal lattice, together with a secret basis for it. Here, we show how to generate ideal lattices (together with a secret basis) according to the average-case distribution used in our worstcase / average-case connection. Generating an ideal lattice according to this distribution is easy, but generating it together with a "good" secret basis is surprisingly difficult. Our solution to this problem is provided in Section 4.
Although the worst-case / average-case connection for BDDP over ideal lattices (Section 3) and the key generation algorithm (Section 4) are our main results, several other reductions are necessary to base our version of Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme on worst-case SIVP over ideal lattices. We summarize these reductions in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Ideal Lattices
By an ideal lattice, we mean an ideal in the ring of integers R = O F , where f (x) is a monic, irreducible polynomial of degree n, and F is the field Q[x]/(f (x)). A good example to keep in mind is f (x) = x n + 1, where n is a power of 2. Then, the ring of integers is simply Z[x]/(f (x)), integer polynomials modulo f (x). In the full version, we address the general case
Each element of R is associated to a coefficient vector in Q n (in Z n in our example). Since an ideal I ⊂ R is additively closed, the coefficient vectors associated to elements of I form a lattice. The term "ideal lattice" emphasizes this object's dual nature as an algebraic ideal and a lattice. Ideals have additive structure as lattices, but they also have multiplicative structure. The product of two ideals I and J is IJ = { v × w : v ∈ I, w ∈ J}, where '×' is ring multiplication. Let F = Q[x]/(f (x)) be the field containing R.
The inverse of a ideal I is I −1 = {w ∈ F : ∀v ∈ I, v × w ∈ R}. For example, the inverse of (2) 
With the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, one can make a stronger statement. 
The constant implied by the "O" symbol is absolute.
Regarding Theorem 2, ∆ F is upper-bounded by ∆(f ), the discriminant of the polynomial f . Since ∆(f ) is the determinant of the Sylvester matrix formed by f (x) and its derivative f (x), it is upper bounded by n n f 2n , where f is the Euclidean length of the coefficient vector of f (x) [33] . As in [10] , we will always use f (x) such that f = poly(n), which implies that ln |∆ F | = poly(n).
We let γ f denote the minimal value such that
For the values of irreducible f (x) recommended in [10] , we have γ f = poly(n). A nice property of ideal lattices in such rings is that they are never too "oblong." In particular, trivially, λ n (I)/λ 1 (I) ≤ γ f , where λ k (I) is the k-th minimum of the ideal lattice I.
Again, a good choice for f (x) is x n + 1, where n is a power of 2. This polynomial has the virtues of being irreducible, satisfying
, and having small values of ∆(f ), f , and γ f .
Gaussian Distributions and Other Preliminaries
For any real s > 0, define the Gaussian function on R n centered at c with parameter
where ρ s,c (A) for set A denotes x∈A ρ s,c (x). In other words, the probability D L,s,c (x) is simply proportional to ρ s,c (x), the denominator being a normalization factor. As in [24] , for lattice L and real > 0, we define the smoothing parameter η (L) to be the smallest
. Some useful lemmas are the following. Proof. See full version.
We use e i to refer to the vector (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with '1' in the ith position. We say that an equality a ≈ b holds "up to negligible error" if a = (1 ± ) · b for some negligible .
Random Self-Reduction of Ideal Lattice Problems
In this section, we present our worst-case / average-case "random self-reduction" for problems over ideal lattices, focusing on the bounded distance decoding problem (BDDP) [19, 30] . We describe our average-case distribution, and specify our average-case and worst-case versions of BDDP. Then we show how to "randomize" worst-case ideal lattices into ideal lattices from our average-case distribution. In Section 4, we establish that the average-case distribution is suitable for KeyGen -i.e., we can efficiently (classically) sample an ideal lattice and a good basis for it according to this distribution.
Our Average-Case Distribution and Hard Problem
Our average-case distribution is simple: uniform over prime (non-fractional) ideals in R that have norms in some specified interval [a, b] .
Our average-case problem is really a "hybrid" of worst-case and average-case. The ideal lattice is generated according to an average-case distribution induced by an algorithm IdealGen. However, the vector t is "worst-case", in that t is only required to be within a certain distance of the lattice; it need not be chosen according to any known (or even samplable) distribution.
Definition 1 (Hybrid Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (HBDDP)).
Fix ring R and algorithm IdealGen that samples ideals in R,
The worst-case BDDP (WBDDP) is identical, except the ideal lattice is not necessarily chosen from an efficiently samplable distribution. For both of the BDDPs, we assume that the s parameter is chosen so that the solution is unique.
We base the security of our version of Gentry's scheme on HBDDP in the full version (and sketch this result in Section 5). As part of this result, we reduce HBDDP to a "purely" average-case BDDP where t is sampled according to a Gaussian distribution. In the full version, we also provide more reductions that (quantumly) reduce worst-case SIVP to WBDDP. We choose to focus on our techniques for randomizing the lattice since they are more interesting.
Statement of the Reduction
Our reduction is stated in the following theorem. It uses parameters that must satisfy certain conditions that we will specify momentarily. 
Theorem 3. Let R be the ring of integers for field
The conditions are as follows (s refers to s WBDDP ):
-log N and log b are only polynomial in the lattice dimension n -s = ω( √ log n), To make the conditions more comprehensible, let us consider a concrete choice of parameters. Set N = b = 2a. Then, for any g(n) = ω( √ log n), we can set
n . This is a very mild lower bound for N , considering that N is related to the norm of M . In particular, the condition a 2 > 2N · et n 0 can be met even when λ n (M ) is small -e.g., polynomial in n.
A "deficiency" of the reduction is that, according to the conditions, the norm of the output average-case ideal is lower-bounded in terms of the norm of the worst-case ideal. It would be preferable to remove this constraint. In a reduction described in the full version, we show that ideals with "small" norms are the "hard case" when one is given access to a factoring oracle, and therefore our reductions ultimately apply even to average-case ideals with fairly small norms.
The RandomizeIdeal Algorithm
Toward proving Theorem 3, we present an algorithm RandomizeIdeal that, assuming the conditions are met, "randomizes" a worst-case lattice into our averagecase distribution. In Section 3.4, we show that one can solve WBDDP by using RandomizeIdeal in combination with a HBDDP-solver.
RandomizeIdeal(R, M, N, s, t, a, b):
1. Outputs ⊥ if the parameters do not satisfy the conditions. Regarding Step 2, one can sample from D M −1 ,s,t·e 1 by using the GPV algorithm [12] with the independent set {e i } in M −1 . Regarding Step 3, let R = Z[x]/(f (x)) and consider the following theorem.
Generates a vector v per the distribution
Theorem 4 (Kummer-Dedekind, as given in [33] ). Consider the factorization
) of R whose norms are powers of p are precisely
There are polynomial time algorithms for factoring polynomials in Z p [x] -e.g., by Kaltofen and Shoup [14] . Therefore, in R , if we have an integer factoring algorithm to factor Nm(L), we can efficiently discover all of the prime ideals that divide L. See [33] for details on how to extend this approach to rings R ⊃ R . Note that since R = O F , the factorization in Step 3 is unique.
Regarding Step 4, there will be at most one ideal in {p i } with norm in [a, b] . If there were two such ideals p i , p j , the norm of their product would be at least
, where we will show the latter term exceeds the norm of L, a contradiction.
Before proving the reduction, we must establish that RandomizeIdeal outputs J according to our desired average-case distribution. We prove this in Lemma 6. Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 establish some preliminary facts. Proof. See full version. Proof. (Lemma 6) Consider the probability that a particular prime ideal J 0 with norm in [a, b] is chosen as the ideal J in Step 4 in a single trial if there is no abort. (By Lemma 5, the probability of abort is non-overwhelming.) Assuming v ∈ t · e 1 + B(s · √ n) (which is indeed the case with overwhelming probability by Lemma 1), we claim that 
Given our claim, for fixed M , the probability that J 0 is chosen in Step 4 is:
(The approximate equality holds up to negligible error, since it relies on v ∈ t · e 1 + B(s · √ n).)
We claim that s exceeds the smoothing parameters of J 0 M −1 and M −1 . Assuming this claim, Lemma 2 implies that
up to negligible error.
Step 5 uses rejection to adjust this probability from 1/Nm(J 0 ) to 1/b, making the distribution statistically uniform (and statistically independent of M ) over all prime ideals with norms in [a, b] . It remains to prove our claim that s exceeds the smoothing parameters of J 0 M −1 and M −1 . This is clearly true for M −1 , which contains Z n as a sublattice. Regarding J 0 M −1 , we have
and the claim follows.
Proof of The Reduction
Finally, we prove Theorem 3, showing how to use the procedure RandomizeIdeal to reduce WBDDP to HBDDP. Intuitively, RandomizeIdeal samples a vector v that is "nearly parallel" to e 1 (since t s), so that multiplying the basis vectors in B M by v is similar (from a geometric perspective) to multiplying by t. Thus, L is geometrically similar to a simple scaling of M , and it is easy to see how a solution to a lattice problem over L (e.g., to BDDP or SIVP) yields a solution to a lattice problem over M . As long as L is not an overly sparse subset of J -e.g., suppose that (Nm(L)/Nm(J)) 1/n is poly(n) -then λ 1 (J) will be only poly(n) less than λ 1 (L), and the BDDP solution to (L, u ) will be the same as to (J, u ) as long as u is sufficiently close to L.
Proof. (Theorem 3) B wants to solve the WBDDP instance (M, u).
It does the following: M, N, s, t, a, b) .
3. Runs A on the instance (J, u ), receiving back a vector y such that u −y ∈ J.
(If A does not solve this instance, restart.) 4. Outputs x ← y/v. First, we verify that (J, u ) is a valid HBDDP instance that should be solvable by A. By Lemma 6, RandomizeIdeal outputs the basis of an ideal J that is statistically uniform among invertible prime ideals with norm in [a, b] . Now let us check that u is also valid. By assumption, there exist m ∈ M and z with z ≤ s WBDDP such that u = m + z. So, u = m + z , where m ∈ M · (v) and z = z × v. Assuming v ∈ t · e 1 + B(s · √ n), which occurs with overwhelming probability, we have
is a sub-lattice of J, we have that u = j + z for some j ∈ J. By the analysis above, A should solve the instance (J, u ) with probability at least . If A solves this instance -i.e., B receives from A the unique vector y with y < s HBDDP such that u − y ∈ J. It must be that y = z . Thus x = z /v = z, and B solves its WBDDP instance.
The probability that RandomizeIdeal does not abort and A succeeds is at least /poly(n). These probabilities are independent over trials, and the claimed running time of B follows.
KeyGen According to the Average-Case Distribution
Our Approach at a High Level
For KeyGen, we want an algorithm IdealGen that generates a random ideal J together with a short vector in w ∈ J −1 to be used as the secret key. Recall how decryption works in Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme, and suppose that R = Z[x]/(f (x)) in this subsection for simplicity. A ciphertext is an integer vector of the form c = j + e, where j ∈ J and e is a short noise vector containing the message. Decryption involves computing the fractional part [w × c], which equals [w × e] since w × j is in R and thus an integer vector. If w and e are short enough -in particular, if we have the guarantee that all of the coefficients of w × e have magnitude less than 1/2 -then [w × e] equals w × e exactly. From w × e, the decrypter can recover e and the message.
How short should w be? Since λ n (J −1 ) is at least Nm(J) −1/n , we cannot expect w to be much shorter than this. (Recall that we choose R such that λ n (I)/λ 1 (I) is polynomial in n.) So, we will consider w to be a "good" secret key with respect to ideal J if w ≤ g(n)·Nm(J) −1/n for some small polynomial g(n). Now, how do we generate a random ideal J together with a "good" w ∈ J −1 ? Our first step is to generate a "small" random ideal K -"small" in the sense that its norm is in [n cn , 2n cn ] for some small constant c, which guarantees that λ n (K) = poly(n). Since the norm of K is so small, e 1 ∈ K −1 is trivially a good secret key for K according to our definition. K is not useful as the ideal in Gentry's scheme, since even very small errors e make ciphertexts indecipherable.
But suppose, as a thought experiment, that we simply set J = K · (v) where v = T · e 1 for some large integer T . That is, J is simply a scaling of K. Then, w ← e 1 /T is a vector in J −1 that satisfies our definition of a good secret key. And J is "large" enough to handle larger error vectors.
However, the simple scaling approach is obviously unsatisfactory for a few reasons. First, it does not generate J according to our desired average-case distribution. Also, it may not even be secure: all of the coefficients of J's vectors are divisible by T , and thus a ciphertext c leaks the value of e mod T . Obviously, we want to avoid these deficiencies.
Instead, as our second step, we sample v ← D K −1 ,S,T ·e 1 where T /S = poly(n). Then, as before, we set J = K · (v), and w ← e 1 /v. That is, we do the same thing as in the simple scaling approach, except that we sample v from K −1 rather than from R, and we choose it to be very close to T · e 1 rather than being exactly equal. It turns out that, if v is very close to T · e 1 , then 1/v is very close to e 1 /T . In particular, w will be a good secret key for J. Fortunately, this approach avoids the deficiencies of simple scaling. We can prove that, by including a couple of rejection steps -to output J only if it is prime, to fine-tune the output distribution, etc. -the J sampled using this approach has the correct average-case distribution.
Intuitively, why does this approach induce a random distribution on J? At a very high level, we can ask: is J random geometrically (e.g., when one considers the "shape" of the parallelepiped formed by J's shortest independent set), and is J random algebraically (e.g., when one considers J's norm)? Geometrically, J inherits K's shape, since (up to some perturbation in the sampling of v) it is a simple scaling of K. We choose K from a large enough space so that its shape, and hence J's shape, is quite "random". Algebraically, the fact that v is sampled from K −1 "randomizes" J algebraically -in particular, J is not divisible by K. But these are only intuitions. Before providing a more precise explanation, we need to describe our IdealGen algorithm in more detail.
IdealGen: The Details
, and α ≥ 1; let S = s · α and T = t · α. It invokes an algorithm TempIdeal(R, i, j), described in Section 4.3, that outputs a uniformly random ideal K with norm in [i, j] (but not a nontrivial "good" key for K). IdealGen ultimately outputs a uniformly random prime ideal J with norm in [2, 3] 
IdealGen:
Continues to
Step 5 with probability Nm(K)/4t 2n ; otherwise, aborts.
Step 6 with probability β ·
, where β will be defined later; otherwise, aborts.
With probability 2t
2n T n /Nm(J), outputs w and the Hermite normal form of J; otherwise, aborts.
Remark 2.
IdealGen is precisely what we outlined above, aside from the probability of aborting in Steps 2-6. We will show that the probability of aborting is non-overwhelming, and that these steps fine-tune the distribution so that J is a uniformly random prime ideal with norm in the prescribed interval. The algorithm can be re-run until it completes successfully. Remark 3. In Step 2, one can sample from the distribution D K −1 ,S,T ·e1 by using the GPV algorithm [12] with the independent set {e i } in K −1 .
Remark 4. By Lemma 1, the vector v is in T · e 1 + B(S √ n) with overwhelming probability. Note that we only abort in
We use a ball of radius 2S √ n instead of S √ n in Step 2 for technical reasons -specifically, Corollary 2 below and its use in the proof of Theorem 7.
Remark 5. Regarding
Step 5, we must ensure that the "probability" is a number
To begin analyzing our IdealGen algorithm, we state some useful lemmas about the vector v sampled in Step 2. Omitted proofs can be found in the full version. The theme of these lemmas is that since v is very close to T · e 1 , it behaves in many respects like T · e 1 .
Our main results about IdealGen are captured in Theorems 5, 6, and 7 -namely, that it outputs a good secret key for J, it does not abort very often (and therefore can be efficiently re-run until it outputs a result), and it outputs J according to the desired average-case distribution.
Theorem 5. The vector w output by IdealGen is a "good" key for J. Specifically,
Proof. (Theorem 5) By Corollary 1, w ∈ e 1 /T +B(4S √ n/T 2 ). So, clearly, w < 2/T . On the other hand, Nm(J) −1/n ≥ 1/(3 1/n t 2 T ). The result follows.
Theorem 6. The probability of aborting in Steps 2-6 is non-overwhelming.
Proof. (Theorem 6) For Steps 4 and 6, the claim is clearly true. For Step 2, it follows from Lemma 1. For
Step 5, we invoke Lemma 10, which implies we can set β ← e −6π √ 1/n , and the algorithm will continue to Step 6 with at least (non-negligible) probability e . By the distribution of ideals (see Theorems 1 and 2) and the claimed distribution of TempIdeal, this occurs only with only constant probability, in which case the probability of aborting in Step 2 is a constant.
Before getting to the last theorem, we state one more lemma.
exceeds the smoothing parameter of J −1 .
Proof. (Lemma 11) We have
Since s = ω( √ log n), the result follows.
Theorem 7. For any α ≥ 1, IdealGen with parameter α efficiently outputs a prime ideal J that is statistically uniform subject to the constraint that
Proof. (Theorem 7) Let K be the sets of ideals with norms in [1, 4] · t 2n , and let J be the sets of prime ideals with norms in [2, 3] · t 2n T n . For convenience, we define some sets of ideals associated to J ∈ J . Let
Define S J identically to S J , except they include only those K for which there is exactly one such v. Lemma 8 implies that S J = S J .
Consider the probability Pr[J 0 ] that a particular ideal J 0 is chosen as J in Step 3. We have
for some universal constant c 1 , where the second inequality follows from the fact that K is chosen uniformly by TempIdeal.
For a particular candidate pair (K 0 , J 0 ) with K 0 ∈ S J0 , let v 0 be the unique vector in
. We claim that, at Step 3,
0 ) This follows because the latter quantity is Pr[v 0 |K 0 ], and from the fact that J 0 and v 0 determine each other once K 0 is fixed. Now, consider the denominator ρ S,T ·e1 (K −1 0 ); we claim that, for fixed (S, T ), this sum is proportional to Nm(K 0 ), up to negligible error. This follows from Lemma 2, and the fact that S exceeds the smoothing parameter of K
Step 3, we have
up to negligible error for some universal constant c 2 . After Steps 4 and 5, we have
up to negligible error for some universal constant c 3 , where w 0 = 1/v 0 and thus
We claim that
up to negligible error for some universal constant c 5 . This claim lets us complete the proof. The abort in Step 6 adjusts this probability so that it becomes c 5 · 2t 2n T n , independent of J 0 , and thus makes Pr[J 0 ] statistically uniform across all J 0 ∈ J .
In Equation 1, the second sum is just a syntactic rewriting of the first sum.
To prove the second equality in Equation 1, first note that
0 . The first inclusion follows from the fact that, by Lemma 2, for every
, it is the case that 1/w 0 ∈ T · e 1 + B(2S √ n). The second inclusion follow from the fact that each w 0 satisfies (w 0 ) = J −1 K for some K ∈ K; in particular, w 0 ∈ J −1 0 . Now, we claim that 
The TempIdeal Algorithm
Here, we construct an efficient algorithm TempIdeal(R, i, j) that outputs a uniformly random ideal K ⊂ R with norm in [i, j] . TempIdeal only needs to output some basis of K, not necessarily a "good" basis. Let us begin at a high level by considering some possible approaches. Suppose we sample random v from R, and set K ← (v), re-sampling if
Then, K is a principal ideal, and unfortunately the probability that a "random" ideal from R is principal is typically negligible in n. (More accurately, the field F = Q(x)/(f (x)) has an associated class group, where each member of the group consists of an equivalence class of ideals. The set of principal ideals is only one class, whereas the class group size is typically exponential in n.) Clearly, this approach does not sample a "random" ideal.
A more promising approach is to use Kummer-Dedekind (Theorem 4), which can actually be used to sample a uniformly random prime ideal, as follows. Sample a uniform prime power p e ∈ [i, j], and use Kaltofen and Shoup [14] to (efficiently) compute the factorization f (x) = i g i (x) e i mod p. KummerDedekind tells us that all prime ideals of Z[x]/(f (x)) having norm p e are of the form (p, g i (x)), where g i (x) is an irreducible degree-e factor of f (x) modulo p. There can be at most n ideals of norm p e . If there are r ≤ n such factors g i (x), restart with probability 1 − r/n. Otherwise, sample one of these g i (x)'s uniformly and output K ← (p, g i (x)). (It it is straightforward to extend this method recover all prime ideals with norm p e in rings Z[x]/(f (x)) ⊂ R ⊆ O F [33] .) This works, but unfortunately we require TempIdeal to sample K from all ideals with norm in [i, j], not just from prime ideals.
Consider the following modification to the above approach: sample a uniform (possibly composite) integer N ∈ [i, j], and compute the factorization f (x) = i g i (x) e i mod N , etc. But computing this factorization is hard in general when N is composite. In fact, we do not see a way to generate a random ideal K without knowing the factorization of its norm.
These considerations lead us to construct an algorithm for generating a random factored ideal whose norm is in the prescribed interval, even though, in principle, we do not need the factorization. For this task, a good place to start is to look at existing algorithms for generating a random factored integer -especially Kalai's elegantly simple algorithm [13] . Remark 6. Kalai presents his algorithm somewhat differently.
As Kalai highlights, the reason this algorithm works is because a prime p ≤ b is in the sequence independently with probability exactly 1/p, since it occurs iff it is chosen before any number in {1, . . . , p − 1}. That is, we could replace the first step of Kalai's algorithm with this alternative step without affecting the output distribution:
1. For each prime number s i ∈ [1, b] , put s i in a list L with probability 1/s i .
Of course, the algorithm with this alternative step is grossly inefficient; Kalai's main insight is a way to obtain the same output efficiently. After this insight, the remainder of the analysis is relatively straightforward. The prime p appears at least e times in L independently with probability 1/p e through Step 2, and thus the probability that a b-smooth number N is selected in Step 3 is proportional to 1/N . The final two rejection steps ensure uniformity across numbers in [1, b] . By Mertens' theorem, the algorithm will not restart in Step 4 with probability θ (1/ log b) . See Kalai's one page paper for more details.
Our TempIdeal algorithm is a modification of Kalai's algorithm that accounts for the fact that there could be up to n prime ideals that are "tied" with the same norm. To each integer s, we associate n ideals {I s,j }. Specifically, if there are r ≤ n distinct prime ideals of norm s, we let I s,1 , . . . , I s,r be these ideals, and set I s,r+1 = · · · = I s,n = 1.
